We show that randomly-selected Reg SHO pilot firms respond to increased threats of short selling by significantly improving their employee relations. Pilot firms enhance employee security to reduce the likelihood of negative announcements that might attract short-selling interest. Consistent with expectations, we find that the largest employee-relation improvements occur among pilot firms that operate in the high tech industry and have above-average levels of R&D intensity, product and labor market competition, financial leverage, and employment-specific litigation risk. We also find that pilot firms with poor employee relations in the pre-Reg SHO period make significantly larger post-Reg SHO employee-relation improvements.
Introduction
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) conducted a pilot program (i.e., Regulation SHO) from 2005 to 2007 in which one-third of the Russell 3000 index was randomly selected to be exempt from short-sale constraints. This regulatory change created a setting that is perhaps as close as one can get to a natural experiment in capital markets research. The lifting of short-sale constraints for a randomly-selected treatment group of firms, while simultaneously holding constant these constraints for a control group of firms, provides researchers with a unique opportunity to identify causal relations between enhanced market discipline (i.e., the increased threat of short selling) and subsequent corporate behavior. Several recent studies have used this Reg SHO context to examine the impact of short-selling pressure on market prices and managerial behavior. Grullon, Michenaud, and Weston (2015) find that "even a subtle regulation like the uptick rule can have a significant effect on the equity prices of financially constrained firms" (p. 35), as well as on corporate investing and financing policies. Massa, Zhang, and Zhang (2015) show that an increased threat of short selling among Reg SHO pilot firms acts a disciplinary mechanism to reduce managers' (mis)use of earnings management. Similarly, Fang, Huang, and Karpoff (2016) find that among pilot firms, "short selling, or its prospect, curbs earning management, helps detect fraud, and improves price efficiency" (p. 1251). While heightened sensitivity to downside risk encourages greater precision in required disclosures, Li and Zhang (2015) find that voluntary disclosures and annual reports become less precise when pilot firms present negative news. Angelis, Grullon, and Michenaud (2016) show that pilot firms try to counteract managers' heightened sensitivity to risk by increasing risk-taking incentives in executive compensation packages. In addition to these SHO-induced changes within the firm, Hope, Hu, and Zhao (2016) posit and confirm that outside auditors increase their fees for pilot firms that face greater short-selling pressure.
The main objective of our study is to extend this line of research by examining the impact of short selling pressure on corporate employee relations. We posit that Reg SHO-pilot firms will implement significant improvements in their employee relations as a direct result of this lifting of short-selling 3 constraints. We expect that pilot-firm managers in the post-SHO period will be more willing to compromise on employee-related concerns in an effort to limit potentially-negative publicity that would attract additional short-selling interest. Hirsh and Cha (2015) show that firms suffer significantly-negative stock returns during (and after) announcements of employee-related lawsuits. They also find that these negative wealth effects are particularly strong when the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) serves as the plaintiff in employee-related cases.
Since employees are a group of important stakeholders who can shape a firm's financial leverage, cash holding, and dividend policies (Berk, Stanton, and Zechner, 2010; Matsa, 2010; Bae, Kang, and Wang, 2011; Wang, 2012; and Ghaly, Dang, and Stathopoulos, 2015) , pilot-firm managers are likely to improve their employee-relation policies to avoid being targeted by short sellers. By examining the relation between the loosening of short-sale constraints and subsequent changes in corporate employee relations, our study provides new evidence on the causal links from enhanced market discipline to corporate decision-making, and from corporate decision-making to employment conditions in the real economy. Our study also sheds light on some of the unintended consequence of regulatory changes. It is unlikely that SEC regulators could have foreseen or anticipated the significant impact on employee relations that would accompany their randomized experiment of loosening short-sale constraints.
In addition to positing (and then confirming) a causal relation between short-selling pressure and employee relations, our empirical analyses also help to distinguish between two competing views of corporate investment in employee relations; specifically, human relations theory versus principal-agent theory. As discussed in Edmans (2011, p. 622) , "Existing theories yield conflicting predictions as to whether employee satisfaction is beneficial for firm value." We examine the market-adjusted stock performance of employee relation-enhancing pilot firms versus non-pilot firms to determine whether improvements in employee relations and employee satisfaction are value-creating investments (i.e., the human relations view) or value-destroying investments (i.e., the principal-agent view). Since the increased investment in employee 4 relations among Reg SHO-pilot firms is an exogenous (regulation-induced) shock, this research design allows us to disentangle these two opposing theories.
Theories about the relation between employee relations' investments and firm valuation remain controversial. Traditional theories (Taylor, 1911) and principal-agent theories (Zingales, 2000) suggest that greater investment in employee-friendly policies will increase operation expenses and reduce shareholder value. In contrast, human relations theories (Maslow, 1943; Hertzberg, 1959; McGregor, 1960) argue that improved employee relations will enhance job satisfaction, motivate employees to work harder, increase productivity and, consequently, increase firm value. To date, empirical evidence on the connection (if any) between employee relations and firm valuation has been mixed. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) , Cronqvist et al. (2009), and Kim and Ouimet (2014) , for example, show that better employee relations do not necessarily benefit shareholders. It should also be noted that the prevalence of endogeneity issues has made the identification of a causal role for employee relations particularly challenging.
The loosening of short-sale constraints for a group of pilot firms exposes these firms to greater downside risk and selling pressure from an especially well-informed set of investors -short sellers. Previous research shows that short sellers are informed investors who are able to obtain and utilize private information to implement profitable trading strategies (Miller, 1977; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1987; Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen, 2002; Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu, 2007; Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2008, Saffi and Sigurdsson, 2011; Akbas et al., 2013; and Boehmer and Wu, 2013) . Short sellers are successful at detecting stock mispricing and then extracting profits by targeting these overvalued firms. Short-selling pressure has been shown to discourage managers from engaging in earnings manipulation (Hirshleifer, Teoh, and Yu, 2011; and Massa, Zhang, and Zhang, 2015) and to prevent financial misconduct (Karpoff and Lou, 2010) . Given the track record of short sellers in identifying and taking advantage of any increase in the firm's downside potential, pilot-firm managers are especially sensitive to corporate announcements or actions that might invite such "bear attacks." We posit that employee-related negative news is just the 5 sort of announcement that pilot-firm managers will try to avoid by making improvements in their corporate employee relations.
Our empirical research design makes use of an exogenous regulatory change that significantly altered short-selling barriers for a randomly-selected group of firms. On May 2, 2005, the SEC implemented a pilot program that removed short-selling restrictions (uptick test and bid test) for 968 firms of the Russell 3000 index. With a well-defined and exogenously-determined treatment group (i.e., pilot firms) and control group (i.e., non-pilot firms), we then use a difference-in-differences approach to identify the impact of heightened short-selling pressure on corporate employee relations. Our empirical results confirm that improvements in employee relations are significantly stronger for pilot firms than for non-pilot firms as a consequence of the implementation of Reg SHO. The overall improvement in employee relations is mainly attributable to reductions in employee concerns; specifically, concerns about workforce reduction and retirement benefits.
Our results are robust to placebo tests based on an experimental design that randomly assigns firms to fauxpilot groupings. Similar to earlier studies that find a reduction in earnings management and financial fraud among firms in the pilot group, we find consistently strong evidence that pilot-firm managers improve employee relations in order to reduce the downside risk associated with heightened threats of short selling.
After confirming the general link between short-selling threats and employee relations, we investigate the determinants of cross-sectional variations in employee-relation improvements. We find that the reduction in employee-relation concerns in post-Reg SHO period is particularly evident among pilot firms operating in high-technology industries and among firms with high R&D intensity. This finding is consistent with the notion that high-skilled employees working in research-intensive industries can exert additional pressure on managers to improve corporate employee relations. The reduction in workplace concerns is also higher when pilot firms face high levels of industry competition and labor mobility.
Employee relations are particularly important for such pilot firms since talented workers can more easily find comparable jobs and transfer their competitive advantages. We find that pilot firms with high financial leverage make significantly-larger improvements in employee relations. The managers of such firms face 6 more adverse consequences (e.g., difficulty with debt rollover, higher costs of debt financing) from the heightened downside risks of short-selling pressure. As expected, pilot firms with relatively poor employee relations in the pre-Reg SHO period also make significantly-larger improvements in employee relations in the post-Reg SHO period. Finally, we show that pilot firms facing higher levels of employee-related litigation risk make significantly-larger improvements in employee relations. Overall, these cross-sectional results provide additional evidence in support of our main hypothesis -heightened sensitivity to downside risk from short-selling leads to significant improvements in corporate employee relations.
Our final empirical section examines two competing views of the connection (if any) between employee investment and firm value. Traditional and principal-agent theories support a labor cost hypothesis claiming that managers should compensate workers according to their reservation wages to minimize the firm's total production costs. Any investment in employee benefits above these reservation wages would represent a wealth-destroying proposition. In contrast, human capital theories place more emphasis on the positive effects of employee morale on worker productivity, and predict that better employee relations will facilitate the hiring and retaining skilled workers. By increasing job security and job satisfaction through employee-relation improvements, managers can potentially increase firm value. To provide additional evidence in this debate, we again make use of the natural experiment setting provided by Reg SHO and test the relation between stock performance (dependent variable) and changes in pilot firms' employee relations in the post-Reg SHO period (main independent variable). The regression results show a positive and significant relation between stock performance and changes in pilot-firm employee relations in the post-Reg SHO period, thus supporting the human relations theories.
In summary, our study contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First, we extend the literature on the disciplining effects of short-selling activities. Previous studies have shown that threats of short selling can deter corporate earnings manipulation (Hirshleifer, Teoh, and Yu, 2011; Massa, Zhang, and Zhang, 2015) and financial misconduct (Karpoff and Lou, 2010) , but no study to date has examined the impact of short-selling pressure on corporate employee relations. Our results demonstrate that the 7 market-disciplining mechanism of short-selling pressure leads to significant improvements in employee relations.
Second, our study adds to the growing literature analyzing the impact of financial markets on corporate policies and the real economy. Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein (2012) argue that secondary financial markets affect real economic activities through the information role of market prices. Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012) , and Khan, Mozaffar, Kogan, and Serafeim (2012) provide empirical evidence that financial markets have real effects on corporate acquisitions, equity issuance and insider trading activities. Grullon, Michenaud, and Weston (2015) document the effects of changes in financial market regulation (i.e., short-selling constraints) on corporate financial and investment policies, and Li and Zhang (2015) provide similar findings with respect to managerial voluntary disclosure decisions. Our study confirms that a change in short-selling constraints can affect the real economy through its impact on employment conditions. Third, we use an exogenous shock to identify the causal link between employee relations and firm value. Edmans (2011) shows that an investment portfolio of companies in the list of "100 Best Companies to Work For in America" can create long-term abnormal stock returns. Faleye and Trahan (2011) find that firms with labor-friendly corporate policies have both superior long-run stock market returns and operating performance. Kang and Kim (2015) suggest that family firms create higher value by treating their employees well. Our results complement these prior studies by showing that improvements in employee relations can increase firm value, at least in part, by discouraging short sellers' attention.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data and sample characteristics.
Section 3 presents and discusses the empirical results, and Section 4 concludes the study. reductions, retirement benefits concerns, health and safety concerns, and other unspecified concerns. In this paper, we sum the ratings for these six strengths and five concerns pertaining to employee relations in order to create the employee treatment index. A higher employee treatment index score indicates greater investment in employee relations. We also construct (separately) an employee treatment strength index and an employee treatment concern index by aggregating the ratings for the six employee relation strengths and the five employee relation concerns, respectively. We further restrict our sample to those firms with available stock returns and financial data in CRSP and Compustat, respectively, and we exclude firms in the financial industries (primary SIC 6000-6999) and utility industries (primary SIC 4900-4999) from the sample.
Sample Description and Summary Characteristics

Sample description
We next merge this list of sample firms with the list of pilot securities announced on July 28, 2004
by the SEC. Our sample includes 1,713 firms (8,473 firm-year observations) with information on their employee treatment, of which 564 firms (2,822 firm-year observations) are pilot firms.
Summary of sample characteristics
Panel A of Table 1 reports the distribution of pilot and non-pilot firms in our sample by year. On average, 33.32% of the sample firms are included in the pilot group across all years, confirming that the group of pilot firms chosen by the SEC Reg SHO experiment is a stratified random sample. and non-pilot firms show no significant difference along various dimensions, except that pilot firms have a slightly higher median profitability, lower mean sales growth, and higher mean (median) market-to-book ratios during the pre-Reg SHO period. Second, during the pre-Reg SHO period there is no significant difference in the employee treatment (strengths/concerns) index between the pilot firms and non-pilot firms.
Third, the pilot firms have a significantly higher employee treatment index (and especially lower employee treatment concerns) than the non-pilot firms in the post-SHO period. 
Empirical Analysis
Impact of Reg SHO on corporate employee relations
In this section, we conduct difference-in-differences tests to investigate the impact of Reg SHO on employee relations policies. Specifically, we estimate the following model in our analysis:
+ Industry fixed effects or Firm fixed effects +ℇ. (1)
where β 3 indicates whether firms included in the pilot program significantly alter their employee relations after being exposed to heightened short-selling pressure in the post-Reg SHO period, relative to firms in the control group.
Our main results are presented in Table 3 . The dependent variable is the employee treatment index in columns (1) and (2). It is broken down into the employee treatment concern index in columns (3) and (4) and the employee treatment strength index in columns (5) and (6). Following Bae, Kang, and Wang (2011) and Grullon, Michenaud, and Weston (2015) , we include firm size, profitability, leverage, market-to-book ratio, tangibility, R&D intensity and sales growth in the regression as independent variables. We also include industry fixed effects in columns (1), (3), and (5), and firm-fixed effects in columns (2), (4), and (6) to control for industry-level or firm-level unobservable time-invariant factors. P-values are estimated using robust standard errors to adjust for heteroskedasticity (White (1980) ) and standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
The estimated β 3 coefficient for our main variable of interest, the interaction term Post X pilot, is positive (0.078) and statistically significant at the 5% level in column (1). It is also economically significant considering that the mean (median) of employee treatment index is -0.24 (0) for all the sample firms across our sample period. Consistent with our main hypothesis, this result shows that pilot firms improve their employee relations more than non-pilot firms after their short-selling restrictions are removed. Managers attempt to reduce their firms' heightened exposures to this source of downside risk by improving employee relations. The result remains the same when we replace industry fixed effects using firm-fixed effects in column (2). Decomposing the employee treatment index into the employee treatment concern index and the employee treatment strength index, we find that the estimated β 3 coefficient for the interaction term Post X pilot is negative and significant in columns (3) and (4), while losing its statistical significance in columns (5) and (6). As expected, the effect of intensified short-selling activities on employee relations is asymmetric since negative news about employee relations among pilot firms is more likely to be exploited by short sellers and incorporated into stock price in the post-Reg SHO period.
Next, we examine the employee treatment concerns index in greater detail by further decomposing it into five sub-indices: union relation concern index, health and safety concern index, workforce reduction concern index, retirement benefit concern index, and the index of other concerns. We use these five subindices as the dependent variables in columns (1) to (5) of Table 4 . The five sub-indices are dummy (dependent) variables which take the value 1 if that specific type of employee concern exists, and 0 otherwise. As in Table 3 , we include the same set of explanatory variables, control for industry fixed effects, and report p-values based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. Table 4 presents the results of probit regressions. The estimated β 3 coefficients for the interaction term Post X pilot are negative and significant when the dependent variable is the workforce reduction concern index in column (3) and the retirement benefit concern index in column (4). These results show that managers target employees' concerns about workforce reduction and retirement benefits in their attempt to mitigate any adverse effects of poor employee relations.
To confirm that our findings do not apply to any random grouping of firms, we conduct a placebo test where we randomly select one-third of the firms from our sample to form a false pilot group and then redo the difference-in-differences analysis as in column (3) of Table 3 . The dependent variable is the employee treatment concerns index and our main variable of interest is the interaction term between the "post-Reg SHO indicator" and the "faux-pilot firm indicator" (i. e. , Post X pilot). We repeat this exercise 1,000 times and record all the instances where there is a significant change in the employee treatment concern index for the faux-pilot firms in the post-Reg SHO period. In Table 5 we report the frequency, mean, and median of the positive and negative coefficient results, as well as the frequency, mean, and median of the positive and negative coefficients that are significant at least at the 10% level. In only 5.1%
of cases do we find a significant reduction in the employee treatment concern index for those randomlyassigned pilot firms in the post-Reg SHO period compared with other firms. We therefore conclude that our main (i.e., Table 3 ) results are unlikely to be due to randomness.
Determinants of improving employee relations
In the analysis above, we confirm our main hypothesis that heightened short-selling pressure acts as a disciplinary mechanism that encourages managers to improve their corporate employee relations, particularly by reducing employee concerns about workforce reductions and retirement benefits. In this section, we examine the firm-level determinants of these improvements in employee relations. We expect that the strength of Reg-SHO-induced improvements will depend on employee skill level (proxied by membership in the high tech industry and R&D intensity), industry competition (proxied by the herfindahl index), labor mobility (proxied by the number of firms in the same industry), financial fragility (proxied by financial leverage), the firm's initial vulnerability to employee-related problems (proxied by the pre-Reg SHO employee treatment index), and the firm's exposure to employee litigation risk (proxied by the number of employment related charges in the firm's headquarters state). We perform subsample analyses by decomposing our sample into firms that possess the attribute of interest and firms that do not possess the attribute of interest (e.g., industry membership, firms above-versus-below the median attribute). We then conduct the same difference-in-differences analysis as in column (3) of Table 3 , using the employee treatment concern index as the dependent variable, and report the results in Table 6 .
In columns (1) and (2), we decompose our sample according to whether the firm operates in the hightechnology industry. We find that the estimated β 3 coefficient for the interaction term Post X pilot is 13 significant only for firms operating in high-tech industries, consistent with the notion that high-tech firms require employees with greater specialized skills. In columns (3) and (4), we divide our sample according to whether the firm's R&D intensity is higher than the sample median. To the extent that high R&D firms employee more highly-skilled, innovative workers than low R&D firms, we expect the managers of such R&D-intense firms to be especially sensitive to employee relations. Consistent with expectations, the estimated β 3 coefficient for the interaction term Post X pilot is significant only for firms with high R&D intensity.
Next, we decompose our sample in columns (5) and (6) coefficient for the interaction term Post X pilot is significant only for firms facing intense competition from industry peers. This finding suggests that managers are particularly concerned about improving employee relations when facing high levels of competition within their industry. In a highly-competitive environment, negative announcements about employee relations are likely to have strong adverse repercussions for the company. Similarly, we also conduct subsample analysis based on labor mobility. With greater availability of job opportunities, employees can exert more influence over managers' decision to improve employee relations. In columns (7) and (8), our high labor mobility indicator equals one if the number of firms in the same SIC2 industry is larger than the sample median, and zero otherwise. Consistent with expectations, the estimated β 3 coefficient for the interaction term Post X pilot is significant only for firms with high labor mobility. When employees have readily-available opportunities to "jump ship," managers are more likely to improve employee relations under the threat of heightened short-selling pressure.
We decompose our sample according to whether a firm maintains high financial leverage in columns (9) and (10). If a firm relies more on debt financing and has higher distress risk, it faces greater exposure to being targeted by short sellers. Such firms have additional incentives to avoid the adverse impact of 14 employee treatment concerns and are more likely to address these workplace concerns. Consistent with this conjecture, the estimated β 3 coefficient for the interaction term Post X pilot is significant only for firms that maintain relatively high levels of debt in their capital structure.
Next, we divide our sample based on the level of pre-Reg SHO employee relations. If a firm has relatively poor employee relations, it is all the more vulnerable to short-selling pressures after the implementation of Reg SHO. We therefore expect a significant change in employee relations for pilot firms that have low employee treatment index measures in the pre-Reg SHO period. To define low pre-Reg SHO employee relations firms, we first run the following pooled OLS regression in the pre-Reg SHO period to estimate the predicted employee treatment index:
Employee treatment Index =α+β 1 (firm size)+β 2 (Profitability)+β 3 (leverage)+β 4 (market to book) +β 5 (tangibility)+β 6 (R&D intensity)+β 7 (sales growth)+ year and industry fixed effects+ ɛ
We calculate the residual employee treatment index as the difference between firms' actual employee treatment index and its predicted employee treatment index. We define a firm as having low pre-Reg SHO employee treatment index if its residual employee treatment index is lower than the sample median.
Consistent with expectations, the estimated β 3 coefficient for the interaction term Post X pilot in column (11) is negative and significant only for pilot firms with poor pre-Reg SHO employee relations.
Finally, we examine pilot firms' exposure to employment litigation risk. We posit that firms facing higher levels of employee-related litigation risk will make the largest improvements in employee relations as a consequence of Reg SHO. We obtain litigation and enforcement data from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) (https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/index.cfm) based on geographic location. We categorize employee-related litigation risk as high if the firm's headquarters is located in a state with a high incidence of EEOC litigation and enforcement actions in 2009. 6 Specifically,
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we decompose our sample into two groups according to whether the number of employment-related litigation cases in the state of the firm's headquarters is above the sample median. Our results in columns (13) and (14) are consistent with expectations. The estimated β 3 coefficient for the interaction term Post X pilot is significant only for firms with relatively-high exposures to employee-related litigation risk.
Overall, the empirical results in Table 6 add additional support to our main argument that an increase in market discipline (through relaxed short-selling constraints) causes managers to limit any downside risk in their corporate employee relations. Consistent with this main argument, we posit and confirm that the degree to which managers will act to improve employee relations depends on various firm-level attributes.
The empirical results show that pilot-firm managers are more likely to improve employee relations when employee expertise is crucial to firm success (i.e., high tech industry firms, high R&D firms), as well as when industry competition, labor mobility, and financial leverage are high. We also show that pilot-firm managers make larger improvement with employee relations when they had underinvested in employee relations in the pre-SHO period, and when they face above-average employee-related litigation risk.
Firm performance
As discussed in our introduction, as second part of our study examines the wealth effects of employeerelation improvements. To date, theoretical arguments and empirical evidence have been ambiguous with respect to a causal relation between employee relations and shareholder value. One reason for this ambiguity is that any empirical analysis trying to identify such a relation will face severe endogeneity issues. While our results are also subject to such concerns, the Reg-SHO natural experiment setting offers a significant improvement over earlier studies in mitigating any endogeneity (or reverse causation) concerns. In this section, we focus on distinguishing between the two competing views of corporate investment in employee relations (i.e., human relations theory and principal-agent theory). If the market considers an increased investment in employee relations as value-enhancing (value-destroying), then we would expect to observe abnormally-positive (abnormally-negative) stock performance for pilot firms that reduce their employees' workplace concerns in the post-Reg SHO period. Table 7 , we examine abnormal stock performance for our sample firms in 2004 in two alternative post-Reg SHO windows. The first window starts from the implementation date (columns (1) and (2)), and the second window starts from the announcement date (columns (3) and (4) indicator takes the value of one if a pilot firm's average employee treatment concern index declines during the post-Reg SHO period compared to the pre-Reg SHO period, and zero otherwise. Our control variables are the same as described in column (3) of Table 3 .
The results in columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 show positive and significant estimated coefficients for the interaction terms (pilot X employee treatment concern index decreases). These findings confirm that firm performance significantly improves in the post-Reg SHO period for those pilot firms that enhance their employee relations. The positive and significant relation between improvement in employee relations and stock performance remains unchanged when we use the alternative window from August 2004 to June 2007 in columns (3) and (4). Overall, our Table 7 results provide new evidence for the debate between human relations theory and principal-agent theory. Our evidence supports human relations theory by showing that increased investment in corporate employee relations is viewed by the market as a value-enhancing endeavor. This is consistent with Edmans' (2011) finding that better employee treatment can bring shareholders higher long-term stock returns.
Short interest and employee relations
Since investors perceive employee-friendly corporate policies as value-enhancing, firms with poor employee relations are more likely to attract short sellers' attention. We therefore expect to observe larger short interest positions taken against firms with poorer employee relations. We construct our sample by merging KLD data with the Compustat short-interest database from 1996 to 2011. The sample is restricted to firms with both stock returns and financial data available in CRSP and Compustat, respectively. We also exclude firms from the financial industry (primary SIC 6000-6999) and utilities (primary SIC 4900-4999).
We define our dependent variable as "significant short interest" which takes a value of one if the firm's average annual short interest is in the upper quartile of the population, and zero otherwise. 7 We include firm size, profitability, leverage, market-to-book ratio, tangibility, R&D intensity, and sales growth as control variables. We also include year and firm fixed effects in the regression model.
We report our regression results in Table 8 . In column (1) our main variable of interest is the employee treatment index, and in column (2) we divide the employee treatment index into its two subcomponents -the employee treatment concern index and the employee treatment strength index. The results in column (1) show that the estimated coefficient for employee treatment index is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. The column (2) results show that the estimated coefficient for employee treatment concern index is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, while the estimated coefficient for employee treatment strength index is negative but insignificant. Overall, these findings are consistent with the argument that short sellers tend to focus their attention on firms that do not adequately address their employees' concerns.
Conclusion
From 2005 to 2007, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) conducted a pilot program (Regulation SHO) in which one-third of the Russell 3000 index was randomly selected to be exempt from short-sale constraints. This experiment created an ideal setting in which to test various hypotheses related to causal connections between short-selling pressures and corporate behavior. Several recent studies have used this setting to investigate the ability of short-selling pressure to discipline (or alter) corporate behavior.
A general theme that runs throughout these studies is that Reg SHO-induced (higher) threats of short selling increase managers' sensitivity to potential sources of downside risk. As managers become more risk averse, they attempt to curtail any corporate behavior or practice that might attract negative publicity -and its concomitant increase in short selling. To date, researchers have confirmed that managers reduce their firms' exposures to earnings management and fraud (Massa, Zhang, and Zhang, 2015; Fang, Huang, and Karpoff, 2016) , as well as to any negative news contained in voluntary disclosures or annual reports (Li and Zhang, 2015) . In addition, researchers have confirmed that managerial concerns about the negative effects of shortselling threats are warranted. Investors charge a higher risk premium to hold Reg SHO-pilot firms in their equity portfolios (Grullon, Michenaud, and West, 2015) , and outside auditors charge higher fees to audit Reg SHO-pilot firms (Hope, Hu, and Zhao, 2016).
The main objective of our study is to extend this line of research by analyzing the effects of short selling pressure on corporate employee relations. We posit that pilot firms will make significant improvements in their employee relations as a direct result of this regulatory change. By examining the connection between short-selling pressure and changes in corporate employee relations, our study provides new evidence on the causal link from enhanced market discipline to corporate decision-making, and from corporate decision-making to employment conditions in the real economy. In addition to confirming this causal link, our empirical findings are also useful in distinguishing between human relations and principalagent theories. We examine the stock performance of employee relation-enhancing pilot firms to determine whether improvements in employee relations are value-creating investments (i.e., the human relations view) or value-destroying investments (i.e., the principal-agent view).
Our research design uses the SEC's exogenous regulatory shock that significantly reduced shortselling barriers for a randomly-selected group of firms. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we show that improvements in employee relations are significantly stronger for pilot firms than for non-pilot firms following the implementation of Reg SHO. We find that improvements in employee relations are mainly attributable to reductions in employee concerns about workforce reduction and retirement benefits.
We examine the determinants of cross-sectional variations in employee-relation improvements and find particularly strong results for firms operating in high-technology industries, having high R&D intensity, and facing high levels of industry competition, labor mobility, financial leverage, and employee-related litigation risk. We also show that pilot firms with relatively poor employee relations in the pre-Reg SHO period make significantly-larger improvements in employee relations in the post-Reg SHO period. Finally, we examine the relation between stock performance and changes in pilot firms' employee relations in the post-Reg SHO period. The results reveal a positive and significant relation between stock performance and changes in pilot firms' employee relations, thus supporting the human relations theories.
Overall, our study contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First, we extend the literature on the disciplining effects of short-selling activities. Our results confirm that the market-disciplining mechanism of short-selling pressure leads to significant improvements in employee relations. Second, we add to the literature that examines the relation between financial markets and corporate policies by confirming that a change in short-selling constraints can affect the real economy through its impact on employment conditions. Third, we use a natural experiment setting to establish the causal link between employee relations and firm value. Investments in employee relations increase firm value by reducing the heightened downside risks of short-selling pressure.
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Appendix. Variable Definitions
This appendix provides a detailed description of the variables used in the tables. Variable Definition Decrease in employee treatment concern index (indicator)
Indicator that takes the value of one if the firm's average employee concern index during the pre-Reg SHO period is higher than the average employee concern index during the postReg SHO period and zero otherwise.
Employee treatment index
The KLD Research & Analytics, Inc. (KLD) SOCRATES database contains ratings on firms' employee treatment, including six strength indicators and five concern indicators. Index is obtained by subtracting the sum of the five concern indicators for the employee relations dimension (i.e., health and safety concern, retirement benefits concern, union relations, work force reduction concern and other concerns) from the sum of the six strength indicators for the employee relations dimension (i.e., employee involvement, health and safety strength, retirement benefit strength, cash profit sharing, union relations, and other strengths).
Employee treatment concern index Index is computed by summing up the five concern indicators for the employee relations dimension (i.e., health and safety concern, retirement benefits concern, union relations, work force reduction and other concerns).
Employee treatment strength index Index is computed by summing up the six strength indicators for the employee relations dimension (i.e., employee involvement, health and safety strength, retirement benefit strength, cash profit sharing, union relations, and other strengths) Leverage Long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities divided by total assets (winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles).
Ln (Firm size) Natural logarithm of total assets.
Market-to-book Market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by total assets (winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles).
Pilot
Indicator that takes the value of one if the firm is included into the SHO-pilot program and zero otherwise. We further restrict our sample to those firms whose stock returns and financial data are available in CRSP and Compustat, respectively, and we exclude firms in the financial industries (primary SIC 6000-6999) and utility industries (primary SIC 4900-4999) from the sample. We further restrict our sample to those firms whose stock returns and financial data are available in CRSP and Compustat, respectively, and we exclude firms in the financial industries (primary SIC 6000-6999) and utility industries (primary SIC 4900-4999) from the sample. The Appendix provides a detailed description of the construction of the variables. The numbers in the test-of-difference columns are p-values. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. We further restrict our sample to those firms whose stock returns and financial data are available in CRSP and Compustat, respectively, and we exclude firms in the financial industries (primary SIC 6000-6999) and utility industries (primary SIC 4900-4999) from the sample. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the employee treatment index. The dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is the employee treatment concern index. The dependent variable in columns (5) and (6) is the employee treatment strength index. The Appendix provides a detailed description of the variables. P-values are in parentheses. We estimate p-values using robust standard errors to adjust for heteroskedasticity (White (1980) ) and cluster the standard errors at firm level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Distribution of Pilot Firms and Non-pilot Firms by Year
Panel
Employee Treatment Index
Employee Treatment Concern Index
Employee Treatment Strength Index We further restrict our sample to those firms whose stock returns and financial data are available in CRSP and Compustat, respectively, and we exclude firms in the financial industries (primary SIC 6000-6999) and utility industries (primary SIC 4900-4999) from the sample. The dependent variables are union relation concern index, health and safety concern index, workforce reduction concern index, retirement benefit concern index and other concern index from column (1) to (5). The Appendix provides a detailed description of the variables. P-values are in parentheses. We estimate p-values using robust standard errors to adjust for heteroskedasticity (White (1980) ) and cluster the standard errors at firm level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. We randomly select one-third of the firms from our sample to form a faux-pilot group and redo the difference-in-differences analysis as in column (3) of table 3. The dependent variable is employee treatment concern index. Our main interested variable is the interaction between "faux-pilot firm indicator" and "post-Reg SHO indicator" (Post X pilot). We repeat this exercise 1,000 times and record the number of positive and negative coefficient results, plus the number of positive and negative coefficient results that are significant at least at the 10% level. Post 0.074*** 0.248*** 0.113*** 0.265*** 0.158*** 0.255*** 0.106*** 0.284*** 0.257*** 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.246*** 0.187*** 0.203*** (0.0041) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (1) and buy-and-hold market-adjusted stock returns for pilot firms during the same time period in column (2). The dependent variable is buy-and-hold stock returns for pilot firms from August of 2004 to June of 2007 in column (3) and buy-and-hold market-adjusted stock returns for pilot firms during the same time period in column (4). The Appendix provides a detailed description of the variables. P-values are in parentheses. We estimate p-values using robust standard errors to adjust for heteroskedasticity (White (1980) ) and cluster the standard errors at firm level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The sample consists of 19,960 firm observations covered in KLD, Compustat, Compustat Short Interest and CRSP databases from 1996 to 2011. Firms in the financial (primary SIC 6000-6999) and utility (primary SIC 4900-4999) industries are excluded. The dependent variable is a significant short interest indicator which takes value of one if a sample firm's annual average short interest is in the upper quartile of the population, and zero otherwise. Sample firm's annual average short interest is calculated by averaging the monthly short selling shares divided by total share outstanding over the year. The Appendix provides a detailed description of the variables. P-values are in parentheses. We estimate p-values using robust standard errors to adjust for heteroskedasticity (White (1980) ) and cluster the standard errors at firm level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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